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Abstract: While controversy about the nature of grounding abounds, our focus is on a 
question for which a particular answer has attracted something like a consensus. The 
question concerns the relation between partial grounding and full grounding. The 
apparent consensus is that the former is to be defined in terms of the latter. We 
argue that the standard way of doing this faces a significant problem and that we 
ought to pursue the reverse project of defining full grounding in terms of partial 
grounding. The guiding idea behind the definition we propose is that full 
grounding is what happens when partial grounding works in a way that ensures that 
the grounded is nothing over and above the grounds. We ultimately understand this 
idea in terms of iterated nothing-over-and-above claims. 
1. Introduction 
Suppose that a collection of one or more facts D grounds some fact A. As a 
preliminary characterization of the distinction between partial and full grounding, we 
can say that D partially grounds A if it contributes to explaining A, and D fully grounds 
A if nothing needs to be added to D to get a fully satisfactory explanation of A. As 
any ground contributes to explaining what it grounds, any ground is a partial ground. 
But not every partial ground provides a fully satisfactory explanation of what it 
grounds, so not every ground is a full ground. Let a merely partial ground be a partial 
ground that isn’t a full ground. 
This characterization serves to identify the distinction between partial and full 
grounding, but it leaves us in need of an account of the distinction—an account that 
exhibits this difference in explanatory import as due to a corresponding difference in 
the way the grounds are related to the grounded. There is a popular definition of 
partial grounding in terms of full grounding that seems to meet this desideratum. On 
that definition—call it the “standard definition”—a merely partial ground is one that 
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leaves out at least one other ground needed to provide a full ground of the fact to be 
explained. If correct, the standard definition provides a tidy explanation of the 
difference in explanatory important between merely partial and full grounds. 
As we have a pre-theoretic grip on both partial and full grounding, endorsing the 
standard definition means making a substantive claim; this isn’t a mere stipulative 
matter. And there is a significant difficulty facing that definition. As we elaborate 
below, the standard definition rules out as impossible a certain kind of situation that 
otherwise seems possible. It might turn out that theoretical considerations ultimately 
favor the standard definition to such an extent that we should reject that appearance 
of possibility. But we can’t assess this defense of the standard definition without 
comparing it to other options. It is important, then, both to get clear on the problem 
and on whether there is a viable alternative. It is worth stressing, further, that what 
we say about the relation between full and partial grounding is likely to have 
repercussions “downstream” in the theory of grounding. We should take care not to 
make a foundational error. 
The paper contains three main sections. In §2 we set out the standard definition and 
the difficulty it faces. We then consider alternatives that reverse the order of 
definition, taking partial grounding for granted and defining full grounding in terms 
thereof. In §3 we consider a variety of unsuccessful attempts to implement this 
strategy. The failures prove instructive, however, and we develop and propose a 
definition in §4. The proposed definition is guided by the idea that full grounding is 
what happens when partial grounding works in a way that ensures that the grounded 
is nothing over and above the grounds. We ultimately understand this idea in terms 
of iterated nothing-over-and-above claims. 
2. A difficulty with the standard definition 
Among those who have explicitly addressed the distinction between full and partial 
grounding, the following definition has emerged as a near consensus view: 
D partially grounds A =def. D, either on its own or together with other facts, fully 
grounds A. 
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This is the standard definition alluded to above.1 It has not gone entirely 
unquestioned. Clark (2015: 190) raises a puzzle about the standard definition and 
emphasizes that rejecting it is genuine option, pointing out that the intuitive notion 
of partial grounding can “stand by itself”. Fine (2012) and Rosen (2015) consider a 
potential counterexample to the standard definition involving knowledge. And 
Leuenberger (2020) proposes two potential counterexamples, one involving alien 
properties and another totality facts. (We discuss the knowledge case and a 
counterexample akin to Leuenberger’s second case below.) Still, the problem on 
which we focus seems to be at least underappreciated, and no alternative to the 
standard definition has yet emerged.  
That problem comes into focus once we consider that the standard definition implies 
the following definition of merely partial grounding: 
D merely partially grounds A =def. D does not fully ground A, but D together with 
other facts fully grounds A. 
Consider just the left-to-right implication of this definition: necessarily, if D merely 
partially grounds A, then there is some collection of one or more facts G such that D, 
G fully grounds A. If that is right, then a merely partial ground cannot exist without 
there being something else that, as we might put it, augments it so that together they 
provide a full ground. Call this the augmentation thesis. If the augmentation thesis is 
correct, then a certain kind of situation is impossible, namely, one in which some D 
merely partially grounds a fact A, but there is no augmenting G such that D together with 
G fully grounds A. 
Call any such situation a case of Non-Augmented (merely partial) Grounding—or, for 
short, a NAG case. The difficulty with the standard definition is this: there is a 
significant case to be made for the possibility of NAG cases but no good reason, 
 
1 Proponents include Audi (2012: 698), Litland (2015: 484), Rosen (2010: 115), and Skiles 
(2015: 720). 
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apart from an assumption of the standard definition itself, for thinking them 
impossible. 
We will consider two types of NAG cases. In one sort, a fact A has a merely partial 
ground D where D cannot be combined with any other facts to provide a full ground 
of A because no collection of facts fully grounds A. In another, less simple kind of 
case, there is some collection of facts that fully grounds A, but the merely partial 
ground D cannot be combined with any other collection of facts to provide a full 
ground of A. We consider each in turn. 
In the first sort of case, nothing is a full ground of the grounded fact. You might 
think that the thesis of metaphysical foundationalism—roughly, the view that every fact is 
either fundamental or fully grounded by fundamental facts—rules out such cases. 
But let us say that a fact is weakly fundamental just in case it has no full grounds and 
strongly fundamental just in case it has neither full nor partial grounds (Leuenberger 
2020). If metaphysical foundationalism is cast in terms of strongly fundamental facts, 
it indeed rules out this kind of NAG case; but if understood in terms of weakly 
fundamental facts, it does not. Of course, whether metaphysical foundationalism of 
either sort should be adopted is a contested matter, but it seems to us that extant 
arguments for foundationalism do not discriminate between the two versions. 
Consider, for example, Schaffer’s reality inheritance argument (2016: 95). The 
argument proceeds roughly as follows: where there is full grounding there must be 
reality inheritance; where there is reality inheritance there must be a source of reality; and 
for something to be a source of reality is in part for it be fundamental. On the face of 
it, weakly fundamental facts can play the role of being a source of reality in the 
relevant sense. 
There is precedent for taking NAG cases of the first type seriously. One way to 
make sense of “strong emergence”—as suggested (not endorsed) by Wilson 
(2018)—is to construe emergent facts in just this way. Emergent mental facts may be 
partly explained by physical facts that ground them even while they cannot be fully 
explained by such—or by any other kind of fact. While we do not mean here to 
defend the claim that any actual facts are emergent in this way, we think it is hard to 
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see any reason that there couldn’t be facts that have exactly that structure. (While Kim 
2009 doubts the coherence of emergence, his argument notably overlooks 
grounding-theoretic characterizations of the notion.) The point has nothing to do 
with mentality in particular; there may be properties utterly unfamiliar to us—
uninstantiated in the actual world—such that in some possible world facts about 
their instances are partially grounded in other kinds of facts but not fully grounded 
by anything.  
We recognize that actual cases can be more persuasive than such mere possibilities. 
Are there any actual facts that have partial grounds but no full grounds? We suggest 
two candidate cases, the first of which is quite simple. Consider a simple atomic 
fact—some object a has property F. Suppose that this fact lacks full grounds, as a 
and F do not decompose into more basic objects and properties. There is some 
plausibility to the claim that this fact is nevertheless partially grounded by the fact 
that a exists. If this is right, then the fact that a is F is a NAG case.2 
The second case involves the interaction of quantified facts and singular facts. For 
convenience we will use “Q” in conjunction with other letters to name those of the 
first kind and “S” in conjunction with other letters to name those of the second kind. 
Consider some true restricted generalization: 
QFG: All Fs are Gs. 
Let this be an accidental truth as well. Interestingly, this kind of case has been used 
by both Chudnoff (2013: 182-187) and Skiles (2015: 729-736) to argue against the 
claim that full grounds always necessitate what they ground. But their observations can 
be turned to a different purpose. Suppose that there are exactly n things that are F; 
let them be a1, a2, … an. Consider the fact: 
SG: a1 is G, a2 is G, … and an is G. 
 
2 Thanks to Kevin Mulligan for suggesting this case.  
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It seems entirely plausible that SG partially grounds QFG. As Skiles notes, it 
obviously doesn’t necessitate QFG. If one thinks that this collection is not only a 
partial ground but a full ground of QFG, then one should conclude that full grounds 
need not necessitate. But is it plausibly a full ground? No—not if a full ground is one 
that provides a fully satisfactory explanation of the grounded fact. 
So far this looks nothing like a NAG case, as there is no reason yet to think we 
cannot find an augmenting ground to add to SG to get a full ground. Perhaps this 
will do: 
QF: The only F things are a1, a2, … an. 
(We understand QF to imply that every listed individual is F as well as that every 
other individual is not.) Why not augment SG with QF? The resulting collection 
specifies the only things that are F and then implies, of each of those things, that it is 
G; that would appear to be a natural enough candidate for a full ground of QFG. It 
is also, of course, a necessitating ground of QFG. Skiles considers this way of 
defending the claim that full grounds always necessitate but rejects it, noting that  
“…the fact that these are the only things that are F is itself an accidental 
generalization, one in need of a necessitating ground” (2015: 734). He seems then to 
think that QF must have some full ground of its own which necessitates it, if the 
necessitarian position is to be defended. But there is another option here: perhaps 
QF doesn’t have a full ground. Skiles claims that it is “undesirable in the extreme” to 
say that this fact is fundamental (2015: 734) Skiles’ rejection here is understandable—
at least, if we read “fundamental” as strongly fundamental, as having no grounds at 
all. After all, QF seems to be at least partially grounded by: 
SF: a1 is F, a2 is F, … and an is F. 
So we agree that QF is not strongly fundamental. But unless we assume that NAG 
cases are impossible, why not allow that QF is partially grounded by SF without 
having any full grounds? 
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One upshot of this discussion is that this argument against the claim that full 
grounds necessitates depends on ruling out NAG cases. More to the present point, 
however, is the observation that facts of the form of QF may count as genuine NAG 
cases. 
That conclusion can be resisted. Can SF be augmented in some appropriate way? Say 
that all the non-F individuals that exist are an+1, an+2, … and an+m. Now consider two 
additional facts: 
SNF: an+1 is not F, an+2 is not F … and an+m is not F. 
QE: For any x, x = a1 or x = a2, or … x = an+m. 
Perhaps SF, SNF and QE together provide a full ground for QF. This has some 
intuitive appeal: list the individuals that are F, those that are not F, and then say that 
those are all the individuals that exist. Then this may fully explain the fact that the 
only F things are a1, a2, … and an. 
Perhaps. We need not take a stand on this question; just consider the two options. If 
SF, SNF, and QE do not fully ground QF, then it seems likely that we have a NAG 
case, as any other options for a full ground seem less plausible than this collection. If 
they do fully ground QF, then we should shift our attention to yet another general 
claim—this time, QE. What, if anything, grounds that fact? 
Consider the fact that enumerates of each individual that it exists: 
SE: a1 exists, a2 exists, .... and an+m exists. 
This collection is a partial ground of QE; it is not a full ground, however, as it 
obviously fails to provide a fully satisfactory explanation thereof. Might there be 
further grounds that augment SE to provide a full ground of QE? It seems unlikely. 
The pattern thus far is the familiar one of flattening the bump in the carpet in one 
location only to see it pop up elsewhere. Leuenberger (2020) arrives at a similar 
conclusion focusing on a totality claim about the existence of facts, using 
Armstrong’s totaling relation (2004: 72). Of course, we have hardly proven that the 
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augmentation thesis fails in one of these places, but the way in which generality 
persistently raises the specter of a NAG case should carry substantial weight.3 
Let us now turn to the less simple kind of NAG case, namely, one in which some 
fact A has a full ground, D is a mere partial ground of A, but no facts can be combined 
with D to form a full ground of A. Might this happen? We may overlook this kind of 
case if we imagine that the members of D are among the facts included in the full 
ground of A; but it is not obvious that they must be included. What might such a 
situation look like? Again, we have two candidate cases to consider, the first of which 
is modeled on Williamson’s (2000) “Knowledge First” view according to which 
knowledge requires truth and belief but cannot be analyzed in terms of truth, belief, 
and additional conditions. Suppose that   
KNOWLEDGE: Amy knows that humans have set foot on the moon. 
is partially grounded by 
TRUTH: It is true that humans have set foot on the moon. 
According to this Grounding version of Knowledge First (GKF), nothing can be 
added to TRUTH to yield a full ground of KNOWLEDGE. As stipulated, the truth of 
GKF does not rule out there being full grounds for KNOWLEDGE. Suppose that 
there is some collection of facts concerning the ways in which Amy’s neural states 
are causally connected to people who have been on the moon such that those facts 
fully ground KNOWLEDGE. Call that collection CAUSE. Suppose further that CAUSE 
does not include the fact that it is true that humans have set foot on the moon (the 
facts in CAUSE may imply this truth without including it). So, we cannot subtract 
TRUTH from CAUSE to get an augmenting ground. If GKF is true, then we may have 
 
3 Fine (2012) argues that it’s useful for the purposes of developing an impure logic of ground 
to postulate a singular full ground for QE, one not partially grounded by identity facts (e.g. 
[a1 = a1]). Nothing in Fine’s discussion, however, suggests that SE (a collection of existence 
rather than identity facts) fails to partially ground this singular fact.  
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a NAG case of this second kind, where the grounded fact is not even weakly 
fundamental. 
(Fine’s treatment of this case is subtle and requires special comment. He considers 
two different conceptions of the partial variety of so-called “strict” grounding. On 
the first conception—called “partial strict” grounding—any strict ground of the 
partial variety is either a full ground or can be augmented with some fact to get a full 
ground. On the second—“strict partial” grounding—he notes that this might not be 
the case. Hence, for Fine the idea that TRUTH is a non-augmented ground for 
KNOWLEDGE is a live option if we have strict partial but not partial strict grounding 
in mind. For what it’s worth, we find Fine’s notion of strict partial grounding hard to 
get a grip on, as it is defined in terms of what he calls “weak” grounding, a notion 
that itself is difficult to understand; see deRosset 2013a.) 
For a second case, consider the following quantified facts: 
DOUBLE: There exists some x such that x is F and G. 
SINGLE: There exists some x such that x is F. 
Suppose that a is both F and G. Call this fact INSTANCE. This fact doesn’t include 
SINGLE and it fully grounds DOUBLE. If SINGLE partially grounds DOUBLE, then it 
appears to be a NAG case of the second sort.4 
In the two cases discussed above, we have a mere partial ground for some fact, and a 
full ground for that fact that does not include the mere partial ground. Why not 
simply combine the mere partial grounds with the full grounds in these cases to get 
further full grounds? As for the first case, the thought would be to simply add CAUSE 
to TRUTH and the result would itself be a full ground of KNOWLEDGE. As for the 
second case, the thought is that we would get an additional full ground for DOUBLE 
simply by adding INSTANCE to SINGLE. 
 
4 Thanks to Ted Sider for suggesting this case.  
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This maneuver, however, requires allowing a full ground to include facts that seem 
irrelevant. Intuitively, the collection that consists of everything in CAUSE as well as 
TRUTH is one which includes an irrelevant element, as the facts in CAUSE seem to do 
all the work on their own. The same goes for the collection consisting of INSTANCE 
and SINGLE—the former seems to do all the work on its own.  
Audi (2012: 699) has proposed a kind of minimality requirement according to which 
any sub-collection of D must “actually do some work” with respect to making A 
obtain when D fully grounds A. As an unqualified ban on unnecessary elements, the 
requirement seems too strong, as argued by Werner (forthcoming). Werner himself 
proposes a more discriminating version, however, that operates at the level of 
immediate grounds. Roughly speaking, an immediate ground is one that needn’t be 
mediated, and a ground has to be mediated when it can only ground the grounded 
via some intermediate grounding steps (Fine 2012). According to Werner’s 
minimality principle, if D is an immediate full ground of A, then either D is minimal 
or is itself the amalgamation of immediate full grounds each of which is itself 
minimal. 
Returning to GFK, it seems that TRUTH is an immediate partial ground of 
KNOWLEDGE, and so long as there is some full ground of KNOWLEDGE, it has an 
immediate full ground. Suppose CAUSE is that immediate full ground. If we simply 
add CAUSE to TRUTH to get a full ground, that would also be immediate; yet it is not 
minimal, nor is it an amalgamation of full grounds each of which is minimal. Given 
Werner’s minimality requirement, then TRUTH, CAUSE is not a full ground for 
KNOWLEDGE after all and our original suggestion that TRUTH is a partial ground 
without an augmenting ground has yet to be ruled out. Corresponding considerations 
apply to the case of SINGLE. 
Between merely possible NAG cases (such as emergent facts), the two candidate 
cases of actual facts that are weakly fundamental, and the two candidate cases of 
facts just considered that are not even weakly fundamental but have non-augmented 
merely partial grounds, it seems clear that we should not rule out the possibility of 
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NAG cases without at least considering alternatives to the standard definition. Let us 
turn to a search for an alternative. 
3. How not to define full grounding in terms of partial grounding 
What would an alternative look like? Presumably we should define partial grounding 
in terms of full grounding or vice versa. In this section we consider a number of 
inadequate attempts to define full grounding in terms of partial grounding. 
In our preliminary characterization, we said that D is a full ground for A when D 
grounds A and nothing needs to be added to D to get a fully satisfactory explanation of A. 
One way to ensure that nothing needs to be added is to require that everything that 
might be added is already included. This suggest the following definition: 
(F1) D fully grounds A =def. (i) D partially grounds A; and (ii) for any G distinct 
from D that partially grounds A, G is a proper sub-collection of D. 
If, however, there could be NAG cases of either of the two sorts reviewed above, 
this condition is insufficient. In any such case, the collection of all the partial 
grounds will still fail to be a full ground. In addition, F1 also fails to identify a 
necessary condition. Suppose that the following three facts obtain: 
BURGUNDY: The ball is burgundy. 
RED: The ball is red. 
COLOR: The ball is colored. 
We take it that BURGUNDY fully grounds COLOR, as does RED. Given F1, however, 
neither does. According to F1, for BURGUNDY to count as a full ground for COLOR, 
every partial ground of COLOR must be included in it—so, RED must be included, as 
RED is at least a partial ground. But, of course, RED is not included given that 
BURGUNDY is a collection of one, so BURGUNDY fails to be a full ground for COLOR. 
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The ground in this case that is “left out” is itself part of a chain of grounds from 
BURGUNDY to COLOR, not something that augments BURGUNDY in its grounding of 
COLOR. This suggests a natural fix: 
(F2) D fully grounds A =def. (i) D partially grounds A; and (ii) for any G distinct 
from D that partially grounds A, either G is a proper sub-collection of D, G is a 
partial ground of some fact among D, or D is a partial ground of some fact 
among G. 
The conditions in F2 are still too strong. Suppose the following facts obtain: 
BASIL: Basil is a goldfish. 
CLARA: Clara is a goldfish. 
GOLDFISH: Something is a goldfish. 
As before, we have two facts (BASIL, CLARA) both of which are full grounds for a 
single fact (GOLDFISH). In this case, however, the two full grounds are not part of a 
single grounding chain; they are independent of each other. This independence 
makes it clear why an appeal to exhaustiveness is on the wrong track. GOLDFISH is 
fully grounded twice over, and this is entirely unproblematic. 
Instead of looking outside D for grounds that may be left out, let us look to the 
relation between D and A. One strategy—as seen in discussions of explanation 
generally—is to require that the explanatory fact suffice for the explained fact. 
(F3) D fully grounds A =def. (i) D partially grounds A; and (ii) necessarily, if D 
obtains, then A obtains. 
This proposal is plainly too crude, however, as conditions (i) and (ii) are too easy to 
satisfy. Consider this fact: 
BASIL & SUM: Basil is a goldfish and 2+2=4. 
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BASIL satisfies the two conditions of F3. It partially grounds BASIL & SUM simply by 
being the first conjunct thereof, and it is of course necessary that if Basil is a 
goldfish, then Basil is a goldfish and 2+2=4. If sufficiency is part of the answer here, 
we must ensure that the sufficiency is relevant to the fact that is fully grounded. 
The natural suggestion is to appeal to the essences of the relevant entities, where the 
relevant notion of essence is the intuitive one that Fine (1995: 281) calls “immediate 
constitutive essence”. The fact that BASIL suffices for BASIL & SUM is obviously not 
part of the essence of, say, addition or being a goldfish. Consider, then, F4:  
(F4) D fully grounds A=def. (i) D partially grounds A; and (ii) it’s essential to 
constituents of either A or facts among D (or collections of such entities) that if 
D obtains then A obtains. 
Unfortunately, F4 is too weak. Consider the following facts:  
CONVICTED: Desmond is a rightly convicted thief. 
STOLEN: Someone’s possessions were stolen. 
CRIMINAL: Desmond is a criminal. 
Proposal F4 implies that CONVICTED is a full ground of the conjunctive fact STOLEN 
& CRIMINAL. First, CONVICTED partially grounds STOLEN & CRIMINAL, since it fully 
grounds the second conjunct thereof. Second, it’s necessary that if Desmond is a 
convicted thief then someone’s possessions were stolen and Desmond is a criminal. 
Third, and finally, it seems to lie in the nature of the relevant entities—the property 
of being a rightly convicted thief, for instance—that it does so. It is because of what it 
is to be a rightly convicted thief that if it is instantiated, someone’s possessions were stolen 
and the person who instantiates it is a criminal. Yet CONVICTED certainly does not 
fully ground STOLEN & CRIMINAL. The fact that someone’s possessions were stolen 
partially explains why Desmond is a rightly convicted thief, not the other way 
around. 
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It may help to have another counterexample with a similar structure. Consider the 
following facts: 
BEIJING: Beijing exists. 
SINGLETON: {Beijing} exists. 
SET: There exists a set. 
Proposal F4 implies that SINGLETON is a full ground of the conjunctive fact BEIJING 
& SET. First, SINGLETON is a full ground of the fact that there is a set and thus a 
partial ground of BEIJING & SET. Second, it’s necessary that if {Beijing} exists, then 
Beijing exists and there is a set. Third, of course, it lies in the nature of {Beijing} that 
if {Beijing} exists, then Beijing exists and there is a set. But it would be an error to 
say that SINGLETON fully grounds BEIJING & SET. The fact that {Beijing} exists helps 
explain the second conjunct, but not the first. The fact that Beijing exists helps 
explain why {Beijing} exists, but certainly not the reverse. 
Perhaps we should strengthen the required essential conditional truth to include 
grounding as follows: 
(F5) G fully grounds A=def. (i) D partially grounds A; and (ii) it’s essential to 
constituents of either A or facts among D (or collections of such entities) that if 
D obtains then D partially grounds A. 
F5, however, also counts SINGLETON as a full ground of BEIJING & SET. It lies in the 
nature of {Beijing} that if {Beijing} exists, then Beijing exists and there exists some 
set or other. It is no less plausible to count it as an essential truth about {Beijing} 
that if {Beijing} exists, then that fact partially grounds that conjunctive fact—after 
all, it seems right to say that part of the nature of {Beijing} is that its existence 
grounds the existence of a set. The example of thieving Desmond can also be put to 
the same purpose. 
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4. How to define full grounding in terms of partial grounding  
Whatever full grounding is, it is supposed to underwrite a kind of fully satisfactory 
explanation. In citing the full grounds, you give an explanation of the grounded fact 
where that explanation is in some sense complete. We think the relevant sense of 
completeness is exemplified in the following inference: 
1. The fact that the ball is burgundy fully grounds the fact that the ball is red. 
2. Therefore, the fact that the ball is red is nothing over and above the fact that the 
ball is burgundy. 
We think this inference is valid. If A is fully grounded by D, then A is nothing over 
above D. There’s nothing more to A than those facts. This is why A is completely 
explained: in citing D, we cite enough to ensure that the entirety of A is grounded in 
other facts—nothing about what it takes for A to obtain is left unexplained. 
At least as we understand grounding talk, if A is fully grounded by D, then A is in a 
sense “reducible” to the facts collected in D. This is a sense of reduction that does not 
require identity; intuitively, the idea is of containment—the fully grounded fact is 
contained already within the facts that fully ground it. The idea that full grounding 
licenses a “nothing over and above” conclusion is certainly not original to us. A 
number of grounding theorists have ventured claims of this sort, often describing the 
grounded fact as an “ontological free lunch” or as “constituted by” the grounding 
facts.5 This implication of full grounding seems to us a clue as to how full grounding 
should be understood. The way full grounding entails that the grounded is nothing 
over and above the grounds exhibits what it is that full grounding is supposed to 
do—yield a fully satisfactory explanation of the grounded fact. It thus seems a good 
place to look for a definition of full grounding. 
We expect, of course, that some readers will find worrisome any attempt to define 
full grounding in a way that makes unabashed use of the “nothing over and above” 
 
5 See Fine 2001: 15–16; Fine 2012: 39; Schaffer 2009: 353; for dissent, cf. Audi 2012: 708; 
deRosset 2013b. 
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locution. We reject the claim that “nothing over and above” is too obscure for 
theoretical work. We admit, of course, that it is not a phrase made familiar and safe 
through any well-established regimentation. And it would not be surprising if some 
genuine semantic indeterminacy accompanies actual use of the phrase. These points 
hardly undermine its suitability as a tool in defining full grounding. Not to put too 
fine a point on it, the same points could have been made about those phrases that 
signal the notion of grounding. An enthusiast for grounding who bristles at the 
alleged obscurity of “nothing over and above” owes us an explanation of how that 
phrase is worse off than “in virtue of,” “makes it the case,” or the like. 
In addition, however, there are several points to be made in defense of using this 
locution in theoretical work. (We will hereafter speak of the “NOA” locution or 
notion expressed thereby.) We stress three such points. First, the NOA locution or 
cognates thereof can be found both in philosophical work and in ordinary English. 
While “nothing over and above” is not so common in ordinary English, “nothing 
but” and “nothing more than” are not unusual. The idea is certainly not just a 
philosopher’s invention. And in philosophy itself, one can find it being used in a 
wide variety of areas both today and in work dating back many decades. Here is an 
example from Wisdom nearly a century ago: 
We must not say that a table is the string of events which make up its life-history. 
For then to say of a table that it collapsed is to say of a string of events that they 
collapsed. On the other hand, the fact that the table collapsed is perhaps nothing 
but the fact that a set of suitably inter-related events includes a collapse (Wisdom 
1931: 192). 
Note that the “nothing but” claim here is combined with the denial of identity—
precisely the feature of “nothing over and above” talk that is most likely to cause 
consternation.6 We want to stress this point, as we have also linked the NOA notion 
 
6 For another good example, consider Wiggins’ (1968: 91) claim from just half a century ago 
that, while a tree is distinct from the molecules that compose, it is “not something over and 
above” those molecules. Notably, Wiggins explicitly draws as a moral the claim that “[o]ver 
and above is one question, identity is another” (92). 
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to “reduction,” which is sometimes understood as a relation that requires identity. As 
we understand the NOA locution, one way for a fact A to be nothing over and 
above a fact B is for A and B to be identical—but it is not the only way. The fact that 
the ball is red might be nothing over and above and the fact that it is burgundy even 
though the constituents of these two facts are not identical (the property of being red is 
not identical with that of being burgundy). What matters is that whatever it takes for 
A to obtain is built into the obtaining of B. In this sense, we think, it is 
uncontroversial that physicalism must be reductive—mental facts must be in this 
way built into the physical facts, regardless of whether they are identical with any 
such facts. 
Second, to get at the NOA notion we need not rely solely on the “nothing ...” 
phrases. Supplementary glosses are available that are, we believe, in keeping with the 
use of the NOA locution in the literature. As noted above, the idea here is intuitively 
that of a kind of containment. Where A is nothing over and above D, A is in some 
sense already there within D. It is not merely necessary that A obtain when D obtains; 
rather, A is built into D so that a world in which D obtains is “already thereby” a 
world in which A obtains (Goff 2017: 43).  
So long as the relata invoked in using the NOA locution are facts or collections of 
facts, another gloss seems especially helpful. Recall what Jackson has described as a 
“location problem”: the task of seeing how certain truths not spelled out explicitly in 
some description of a situation are nonetheless implicit in that description (1998: 1–
5). For a simple example, the fact that the pixels are arranged in such-and-such a way 
might implicitly include the fact that the screen depicts a circular figure. It seems to 
us plain that if this notion of implicit content is clear enough, then so is the NOA 
notion; indeed, they seem identical so long as NOA is used to relate facts. And—we 
stress—our own use of the NOA notion is limited to cases where the relata are facts. 
By endorsing the claim that what is fully grounded is nothing over and above the 
grounds we don’t need to rely on talk of an object or a property as nothing over and 
above other objects or properties; our reliance on the NOA locution is in this way 
rather minimal. 
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Let us review one further way of getting a handle on the NOA locution. This way 
appeals to the notion of ontological commitment. Lewis claims that mereology is 
ontologically innocent in the following sense: “In general, if you are already 
committed to some things you incur no further commitment when you affirm the 
existence of their fusion” (1991: 81–82). Repurposing the proposal for facts, we may 
suggest a general guide: whenever one fact is nothing over and above another, one 
who is already committed to the former fact obtaining does not, in acknowledging 
that the latter also obtains, incur a further commitment. While we think this is a 
helpful way to get a grip on the NOA notion, we caution against too blunt a use of 
it. Is a “further commitment” to be understood as merely any commitment to some 
fact distinct from any to which you were previously committed? If so, the guide 
delivers the wrong results. While RED is nothing over and above BURGUNDY in the 
relevant sense, these are distinct facts, given that they involve distinct properties. 
Compare the present point to what Chalmers says about the biological facts when he 
supposes them to be a free lunch with respect to the physical facts: “They may 
be different facts (a fact about elephants is not a microphysical fact), but they are 
not further facts” (1996: 41). The “further” here is akin to how the term is used in 
Lewis’s discussion—to have a further commitment in the relevant sense requires that 
the commitment have an additional cost with respect to one’s other commitments, 
which is potentially relevant to the ontological economy of one’s theory compared to 
others (Cameron 2014; Schaffer 2015). In accepting RED in addition to BURGUNDY 
one is not sticking one’s neck out more than one already has. 
The appeal to ontological commitment may be most useful in getting at the relevant 
NOA notion if it is combined with the talk of containment. If, after accepting RED 
one comes to feel that one has stuck one’s neck out further than one would like, that 
either means one thinks RED is not contained in BURGUNDY or that one has yet to 
reckon with the costs of accepting BURGUNDY in the first place. The point, in any 
case, is that the appeal to commitment can indeed be useful in triangulating the 
NOA notion, especially if used in combination with other ways of getting a handle 
on the idea. 
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Finally, as a third point about our use of the NOA locution, even if ideally we should 
dispense with NOA talk, so long as its use consistently tracks a coherent notion, we 
can at least arrive at a true claim about the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
ground to count as a full ground. We think that the proposal we will offer below is 
both extensionally adequate and illuminating in that it gets at what makes a ground a 
full ground. But if we are wrong about the latter point, the proposal can still serve as 
a constraint on further theorizing about grounding. It is hard to believe that the 
NOA locution is in such poor shape it cannot even serve to circumscribe a 
constraint of this sort. 
A different objection to our use of the NOA locution is not that it is too obscure but 
that it is too close in meaning to the notion of full grounds to be used in illuminating 
the latter. We agree they are closely related, but there is some significant distance 
between them. Note that nothing over-and-above-ness has different formal 
properties than grounding. Grounding is apparently irreflexive and asymmetric. Since 
one way for A to be nothing over and above B is for A and B to be the same fact, 
nothing-over-and-above-ness in the relevant sense is by contrast reflexive. And, 
while nothing-over-and-above-ness is not symmetric (STOLEN is nothing over and 
above CONVICTED but not vice versa), it’s not asymmetric either (BEIJING is nothing 
over and above SINGLETON and vice versa). 
(We acknowledge, though, that both grounding and nothing-over-and-above-ness 
are transitive: if A is nothing over and above B, and B is nothing over and above C, A 
is nothing over and above C. To revert to the containment language: if all it takes for 
A to obtain is contained in B, and all it takes for B to obtain is contained in C, then this 
consequence is inevitable.) 
The distance between the notions is illustrated by the fact that one cannot easily 
provide a simple definition of full grounding in terms of NOA. Consider the 
following proposal:  
(F6) D fully grounds A=def. (i) A is nothing over and above D; and (ii) A is not 
identical with any fact among D.  
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Our example of thieving Desmond shows that F6 is insufficient. If we take 
CONVICTED as the ground and STOLEN & CRIMINAL as the grounded, the example 
meets the conditions in F6. However exactly facts are to be individuated, it seems a 
mistake to treat CONVICTED as identical with STOLEN & CRIMINAL. Moreover, the 
latter isn’t among the former, as the former is a collection of one. Further, STOLEN & 
CRIMINAL seems to be nothing over and above CONVICTED. To say otherwise would 
imply that the conjunctive fact is indeed something “over and above” CONVICTED, 
that there is something to this fact that goes beyond what is already built into 
CONVICTED. And that’s a mistake. First, there being someone whose possessions 
were stolen is nothing over and above Desmond’s being a rightly convicted thief— 
STOLEN is built into CONVICTED, even if it’s not grounded by such. Once we have on 
the scene, so to speak, the fact that Desmond is a rightly convicted thief, we already 
have on the scene the fact that someone’s possessions were stolen. Second, 
Desmond’s being a criminal is nothing over and above Desmond being a rightly 
convicted thief; this looks like a simple case of full grounding with a nothing-over-
and-above consequence. Yet CONVICTED is not a full ground of STOLEN & 
CRIMINAL. 
We have seen that F6 is not extensionally adequate. You might think that it fails in 
another way as well: should we not say that A is nothing over and above D because D 
fully grounds A, not that D fully grounds A because A is nothing over and above D? 
This point may make it seem that appealing to “nothing over and above” in defining 
full grounds is simply on the wrong track. 
But this would be premature. Suppose that D fully grounds A. In this case, A is 
nothing over above D, and we agree that this is due to D’s role in grounding A—but 
this role can be characterized as partial grounding. We don’t need to say that A is 
nothing over and above D in virtue of the fact that D is a full ground of A; we can say 
instead that A is nothing over and above D because of facts about D’s partial grounding of 
A. Otherwise put: A is nothing over and above D because of D’s partial grounding of 
A; this then is why D fully grounds A. In slogan form: 
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Full grounding is what happens when partial grounding works in a way that 
ensures that the grounded is nothing over and above the grounds. 
How might this idea yield a definition? Our slogan invokes three conditions. The 
first is that D partially grounds A; the second is that A is nothing over and above D; 
and the third concerns the relationship between these two. To follow our slogan, we 
want to specify that relation by spelling it out as clause (iii) below: 
D fully grounds A=def. (i) D partially grounds A; (ii) A is nothing over and above 
D; and (iii) … 
A natural attempt is to appeal to sufficiency again:  
Necessarily, if D obtains, then A is nothing over and above D. 
This won’t do, however. The account so formulated implies that SINGLETON fully 
grounds BEIJING & SET. Condition (i) is met. SINGLETON fully grounds SET, so it 
partially grounds the conjunction of which SET is a conjunct. Condition (ii) is met as 
well. This may seem less obvious at first, but we can see the point by considering the 
contrary option, that BEIJING & SET is indeed something over and above SINGLETON. 
That claim is surely false: once {Beijing} exists, everything that makes for the 
conjunctive fact is already there on the scene. The existence of Beijing is built into 
the existence of {Beijing} and the existence of at least one set is also built into the 
existence of {Beijing}. Finally, the third condition is met, as there is no world in 
which SINGLETON obtains and the previous two points don’t apply. 
Grounding- and essence-theoretic approaches to the connection between the fact 
that A is nothing over and above D and the fact that D partially grounds A likewise 
fail, though we won’t go into all the details here. Consider just one attempt; say we 
spell out the third condition as follows: 
Necessarily, if D partially grounds A, then A is nothing over and above D and [D 
partially grounds A] itself partially grounds [A is nothing over and above D].  
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The SINGLETON and BEIJING & SET case works as a counterexample here as well. It 
seems that the fact that SINGLETON partially grounds BEIJING & SET itself partially 
grounds the fact that BEIJING & SET is nothing over and above SINGLETON. This is 
because SINGLETON partially grounds BEIJING & SET by fully grounding the second 
conjunct, which ensures that the second conjunct is nothing over and above 
SINGLETON. The same point can be made using the CONVICTED and STOLEN & 
CRIMINAL case. 
We propose instead that the relevant connection is the NOA relation itself. The 
thought is that when D fully grounds A, not only is A nothing over and above D; 
further, this status of A is itself nothing over and above the fact that D partially 
grounds A. This is the last step in devising our proposed definition—the “Iterated 
Nothing Over and Above” definition: 
(INOA) D fully grounds A=def. (i) D partially grounds A; (ii) A is nothing over and 
above D; and (iii) [A is nothing over and above D] is itself nothing over and 
above [D partially grounds A]. 
The definition boasts a pleasing symmetry of structure: we have full grounding when 
we have partial grounding (the first condition) and the grounded is nothing over and 
above the grounds (the second condition) and when the second condition is itself 
nothing over and above the first condition (the third condition). More important, 
however, is that the definition is motivated by the idea that full grounding is what we 
get when partial grounding works in a way to make the grounded nothing over and 
above the grounds. So far as INOA reflects this rationale, it has considerable 
plausibility. 
INOA must also, of course, classify cases appropriately. Let us consider how it fares 
with respect to a modest budget of varying examples. For our first example, the full 
grounding claim to be vindicated is (1): 
(1) BEIJING fully grounds SINGLETON. 
According to INOA, (1) is true if and only if:  
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(1a) BEIJING partially grounds SINGLETON. 
(1b) SINGLETON is nothing over and above BEIJING. 
(1c) [SINGLETON is nothing over and above BEIJING] is itself nothing over and 
above [BEIJING partially grounds SINGLETON]. 
Supposing that singletons are fully grounded by their members, (1a) is met. While the 
commitment to BEIJING obtaining and the commitment to SINGLETON obtaining are 
distinct commitments, plausibly the latter doesn’t have an additional cost to the 
former (Cameron 2014: 95). Given our discussion of the connection between NOA 
and commitment above, this suggests that (1b) is met. Why think that (1c) is also 
correct? We will offer a way of thinking about this that is—we freely admit—
somewhat loose and intuitive. Nonetheless, it seems to us to be on the right track, 
and what matters here is that the comments below make (1c) plausible, even if there 
are good questions about how the comments below themselves should be 
elaborated. 
Intuitively, there is nothing more to [SINGLETON is nothing over and above BEIJING] 
than [BEIJING partially grounds SINGLETON] because of the way the former partially 
grounds latter. We understand talk of “the way” in which BEIJING partially grounds 
SINGLETON in terms of certain features of these facts. Given the character of the 
relata here, there is nothing more to this fact (SINGLETON) being nothing over and 
above that fact (BEIJING) than that fact partially grounding this fact. The grounding 
relation itself does not ensure this, as it is neutral between full and merely partial 
grounding. But when it relates the appropriate relata, the status of the grounded as 
nothing over and above the grounding is itself a free lunch. 
Not just any features of those specific relata matter, of course. Consider a feature of 
the relata that isn’t relevant to BEIJING’s partially grounding SINGLETON, such as 
BEIJING’s being such that it is partially grounded by facts concerning certain social 
conventions. This feature isn’t relevant to the truth of the iterated NOA claim either. 
But now consider features of the relata that are relevant to BEIJING’s partially 
grounding SINGLETON, such as BEIJING’s being such that it concerns the existence of 
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an urelement, and SINGLETON’s being such that it concerns the existence of a set, 
one with that urelement as its sole member. These sorts of features are relevant to 
the truth of the iterated NOA claim. 
For another example of full grounding, consider facts about knowledge again; but 
this time let us suppose that the fact that a person knows something can be analyzed 
into the claim that the person has an undefeated, true, justified belief with that 
content. Let us use again Amy’s knowledge as our example: 
KNOWLEDGE: Amy knows that humans have set foot on the moon. 
BELIEF: Amy has an undefeated, true, justified belief that humans have set foot 
on the moon. 
If indeed knowledge can be analyzed in this way, it seems safe to say that 
(2) BELIEF fully grounds KNOWLEDGE. 
According to INOA, (2) is true if and only if: 
(2a) BELIEF partially grounds KNOWLEDGE. 
(2b) KNOWLEDGE is nothing over and above BELIEF. 
(2c) [KNOWLEDGE is nothing over and above BELIEF] is itself nothing over and 
above [BELIEF partially grounds KNOWLEDGE]. 
It seems that INOA handles this case well. As before, it is the third condition that 
deserves special note. Recall that we are here stipulating that knowledge in general is 
just a matter of having an undefeated justified true belief. The way BELIEF partially 
grounds KNOWLEDGE is by exhibiting the particular person (Amy) and proposition 
(that humans have set foot on the moon) as being an instance of that generalization. 
That generalization itself may be understood as a kind of “nothing over and above” 
claim: generally, knowing that p is nothing more than having an undefeated justified 
true belief that p. If that is right, then the way that BELIEF partially grounds 
KNOWLEDGE is by relating the particular case of Amy and Amy’s belief to that 
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general fact about what knowledge generally “boils down” to. As a result, the fact 
that KNOWLEDGE is nothing over and above BELIEF is already built into the fact that 
BELIEF partially grounds KNOWLEDGE. So (2c) is true, as predicted by INOA. 
Let us now turn to an example that caused trouble before. Consider the false (3): 
(3) CONVICTED fully grounds STOLEN & CRIMINAL.  
According to INOA, (3) is true if and only if:  
(3a) CONVICTED partially grounds STOLEN & CRIMINAL.  
(3b) STOLEN & CRIMINAL is nothing over and above CONVICTED. 
(3c) [STOLEN & CRIMINAL is nothing over and above CONVICTED] is itself 
nothing over and above [CONVICTED partially grounds STOLEN & CRIMINAL]. 
We have already discussed (3a) and (3b) and why they should be accepted. We 
submit that (3c) should be rejected. To see why, it helps to attend to the way in which 
a fact may serve as a ground of another. The way that CONVICTED partially grounds 
STOLEN & CRIMINAL is by means of two steps: first, CONVICTED fully grounds 
CRIMINAL. The fact that Desmond is a rightly convicted thief fully explains the fact 
that he is a criminal. Second, however, as CRIMINAL is one conjunct of STOLEN & 
CRIMINAL, CONVICTED also serves as a merely partial ground of that conjunctive 
fact. In this light, the fact that CONVICTED partially grounds STOLEN & CRIMINAL 
doesn’t reflect on the status of its first conjunct STOLEN. For something to explain 
the nothing-over-and-above status of the conjunctive STOLEN & CRIMINAL, however, 
it obviously must illuminate the status of both conjuncts. 
When we argued earlier that (3b) is correct, we emphasized that STOLEN is built into 
CONVICTED: for it to be the case that Desmond is a rightly convicted thief is in part 
for him to have stolen something, and for him to have stolen something is in part for 
someone’s possessions to have been stolen. If we are to identify something that 
contains the entirety of the fact that STOLEN & CRIMINAL is nothing over and above 
CONVICTED, we must find something that includes this fact about the way STOLEN is 
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built into CONVICTED. The fact that CONVICTED partially grounds STOLEN & 
CRIMINAL fails on this count. As we might put it, (3b) is indeed something over and 
above (3a); that additional something is, precisely, the fact that STOLEN is nothing 
over and above CRIMINAL. A similar story can be told about the case of SINGLETON 
as an alleged full ground of BEIJING & SET. 
For one last example, we consider a new case that, we think, illustrates the utility of 
INOA in adjudicating new and odd cases. Suppose again that BURGUNDY (the fact 
that the ball is BURGUNDY) obtains. In this case, RED (the fact that the ball is red) 
obtains as well. What should we say about (4)? 
(4) BURGUNDY fully grounds BURGUNDY & RED. 
We imagine that you hesitate a bit (we certainly have), but with INOA as a guide, we 
can identify what seem to be the relevant considerations and arrive at a satisfying 
answer. Given INOA, (4) is true if and only if: 
(4a) BURGUNDY partially grounds BURGUNDY & RED. 
(4b) BURGUNDY & RED is nothing over and above BURGUNDY. 
(4c) [BURGUNDY & RED is nothing over and above BURGUNDY] is itself nothing 
over and above [BURGUNDY partially grounds BURGUNDY & RED]. 
It is obvious that (4a) is correct. But the way BURGUNDY partially grounds 
BURGUNDY & RED is of special interest, since there is a sense in which it does this 
twice over. BURGUNDY does it first by supplying one conjunct of the conjunctive 
fact, namely BURGUNDY. By itself, that’s enough for BURGUNDY to be a partial 
ground. But it is a partial ground of the conjunctive fact again by being a full ground 
of the other conjunct, namely RED. The fact that BURGUNDY partially grounds 
BURGUNDY & RED involves the former relating to the latter in both of these ways. 
It also seems clear that (4b) is correct. If BURGUNDY & RED were something over and 
above BURGUNDY, it seems that at least one of its conjuncts must be something over 
and above BURGUNDY. That could hardly be the case with the first conjunct, as that 
 27 
is BURGUNDY itself, and the second conjunct, RED, is nearly a paradigm case of one 
fact being nothing over and above another one. 
But how is (4c) to be assessed? The points made above in justifying both (4a) and 
(4b) are at this point helpful, as they point to features of both that seem relevant to 
(4c). Let us ask about (4b): what is involved in the fact that BURGUNDY & RED is 
nothing over and above BURGUNDY? In motivating (4b), we made salient two 
features of the situation. The first was the identity of one conjunct of BURGUNDY & 
RED with BURGUNDY itself. Does that fact involve anything over and above what is 
involved in the partial grounding fact (4a)? No. As we saw, one of the two ways in 
which the partial grounding of BURGUNDY & RED by BURGUNDY works is by means 
of the identity of the latter with one conjunct of the former. The first salient feature 
of (4b) is thus not anything over and above the partial grounding fact (4a). 
The second point about (4b) highlighted by our comments above was that RED is 
nothing over and above BURGUNDY. Is that fact anything over and above the partial 
grounding fact (4a)? Again, no. One of the two ways in which the partial grounding 
of BURGUNDY & RED by BURGUNDY works is by means of the latter fully grounding 
RED. That fact itself involves—as per INOA—the fact that RED is nothing over and 
above BURGUNDY. The nothing-over-and-above status of BURGUNDY & RED then, is 
yet again not anything more than what is involved in the partial grounding fact (4a). 
Together these points make (4c) plausible, and if INOA is correct, (4) itself is true. Is 
that verdict plausible? When we consider (4) without any suggested account of full 
grounding, it is hard to know what to say. Working through how INOA applies to 
this case not only delivers the verdict that (4) is true, however; it also helps make (4) 
seem intuitively correct—or so it seems to us. 
Our brief review of cases is far from dispositive, of course. There remains much 
more one could do to investigate the adequacy of the INOA account by way of its 
treatment of cases. Nonetheless, given the plausibility of the slogan that guided our 
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formulation of INOA, we suggest INOA as a serious contender for a definition of 
full grounding.7 
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